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he peasant is back. In its World Development Report 2008, the 
World Bank rediscovered, after 25 years, agriculture as “a road 
to  development.”  If  we  want  to  meet  the  Millennium  Goals  of 
halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, dixit the report, the 
agricultural  sector  must  be  placed  (again)  at  the  center  of  the 
development  agenda.  This  implies  new  investments  in  the  first 
sector, after decades of negligence, and support to small farmers. 
At the same time “countries must deliver on vital reforms such as 
cutting  distorting  subsidies  and  opening  markets”  (World  Bank, 
2008). In this way the report tries to reconcile new forms of nation-
al  development  with  the  old  mantra  of  open  borders  and  free 
trade. More recently, the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a 
World  Bank  and  Food  and  Agricultural  Organization  (FAO) 
organization,  put  things  more  clearly,  stressing  that  “business  as 
usual is no longer an option.” Agricultural progress has to place 
“greater emphasis on safeguarding natural resources and on ‘agro-
ecological’  practices.  These  include  using  natural  fertilizers  and 
traditional seeds, intensifying natural processes and reducing the 
distance  between  agricultural  production  and  the  consumer” 
(IAASTD, 2008).  
  Is it a coincidence that the small agricultural producer is back 
in a time of soaring food prices and new waves of food riots, in a 
year  that  the  United  Nations  declared  as  an  historical  turning 
point? For the first time in our history, more people on earth live 
in  cities  than  in  the  countryside  (U.N.  Human  Settlements  Pro-
gramme,  2006).  One  out  of  three  city  dwellers,  about  1  billion 
people, are living in slums, which brings into question the idea of 
urban sustainability. Combining these events and putting them in 
T REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
 
40  Eric Vanhaute 
 
 
an historical perspective can deepen our understanding of what is 
going on. 
  This  article  tries  to  understand  today’s  concerns  about  the 
decay of the peasantries and the loss of food security on a massive 
scale within a long-term and global perspective. Guiding questions 
are: How to handle the local scale of the peasant with the global 
scale of societal transformations? How to define peasantries? How 
is the fate of peasantries linked to economic development and so-
cial inequality? What can new research on the success and decline 
of peasantries teach us? 
 
 
1. SCALES AND SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN WORLD HISTORY 
 
  In a recent publication, Saskia Sassen stressed the importance 
of divergent scales of time and space in social research. What we 
need, she claimed, is a critical stance toward scale, recognizing the 
historicity  of  scales  and  resisting  the  reification  of  the  national 
scale so present in most social science (2007: 82). To understand 
the global, we have to understand the subnational and the local: 
“Studying the global, then, entails not only a focus on that which is 
explicitly global in scale, but also a focus on locally scaled practices 
and conditions articulated with global dynamics and a focus on the 
multiplication of horizontal cross-border connections among vari-
ous localities” (Sassen, 2007: 90). This understanding, or reconcep-
tualizing, of the local entails “an at least partial rejection of the no-
tion  that  local  scales  are  inevitably  part  of nested  hierarchies of 
scale running from the local to the regional, the national, the inter-
national” (Sassen, 2007: 99). 
  World-systems analysis is one of the strongest tools for this si-
multaneous analysis of time and space as structuring variables. Al-
though often criticized as a one-dimensional top-bottom paradigm, 
Wallerstein’s work can also be read as intensive dialectics between 
the global and the local, as “a sophisticated tension between scales 
rather than a simplistic global determinism” (Moore, 2003: 311). 
World-systems analysis labels the modern world-system as both an 
historical  and  geographical  structuring  system.  As  Jason  Moore 
states,  four  processes  interact  in  this  restructuring:  equalization 
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vergence (between geographical regions, core and periphery), and 
agro-ecological transformation (“the rise of capitalism was part and 
parcel  of  a  radical  reshaping  of  world  ecology”  2003:  310–11). 
Asymmetric  relationships  between  regions  feed  the  system  and 
time and again restructure geographical spaces. 
  On a systemic level not only spaces but also social formations 
are redefined. It must be the ambition of world history to become, 
as Kenneth Pomeranz decribes it, part of the social history of com-
munities and social groups. This can only be achieved by combin-
ing different scales: “And ultimately, of course, world history, like 
any national or local history, must integrate culture, politics, econom-
ics, environment, and so on, no matter how difficult this is on a 
given spatial or temporal scale” (2007: 70). Essential is the labelling 
and  categorization  of  social  groups,  which  is  an  interaction  be-
tween the local, the supralocal, and the global: “In the process, we 
create more multilayered and nuanced social histories of conven-
tional local, regional, and national units, histories to place alongside 
the social histories of groups whose definitions and spatial bounda-
ries come from world history itself” (Pomeranz, 2007: 98). 
  An inspiring example of reconceptualizing a social formation 
within  changing  global  contexts  is  the  work  of  Joan  Smith  and 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Creating and Transforming Households (1992). 
This book on “households as an institution of the world-economy” 
was a real eye-opener for me, a “rural historian” who had finished 
my Ph.D. in the Annales tradition of microscopic village studies. 
The constructivist view, which states that these institutions have dif-
ferent forms and play different roles in different social settings, is 
pivotal  to  our  understanding  of  household  formation.  Together 
with this, world-systems analysis allows us to combine this micro-view 
on households with changes on the meso- (regional systems, states), 
and  the  macro-scale  (world-economy).  Households  compose  the 
broader system, but are also modelled by that system.  
  In more general terms, capitalism can be defined as an inclu-
sive system, integrating also what generally is perceived as non-capi-
talist institutions, processes, or systems. As Smith and Wallerstein 
have argued, households are non-capitalist islands within the big 
capitalist sea. Even more, they are very functional and even indis-
pensable  for  the  working  of  that  societal  system,  by  providing 
cheap  labor,  subsistence,  and  protection  and  by  lowering  social 
costs. “Non-waged labor is no less capitalist than the labor in the REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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most advanced robotized plant” (Smith & Wallerstein, 1992: 264). 
As  they  argue,  this  capitalist  system  cannot  bear  the  cost  of  a 
majority of truly wage-centered households: “In a capitalist system, 
wages can never be the sole or even the principal mode of pay-
ment of  the  vast  majority  of  the  world’s  work  force”  (Smith  & 
Wallerstein, 1992: 264). 
  On the other hand, this inclusive world-system uses increasingly 
exclusive concepts to define and remodel reality: capitalist vs. non-
capitalist, citizen vs. non-citizen, labor vs. non-labor, etc. The ques-
tion of how the capitalist system invented or redefined social con-
cepts such as household, class, gender, race, and also peasant and 
worker is a major research topic in modern world history. It is ob-
vious from the work of Wallerstein and Smith that we need an in-
clusive model of analysis to understand the way these social con-
structs  have  changed.  Turning  back  to  our  example,  peasantries 
are  probably  the  most  clear-cut  example  of  non-  and  even  anti-
capitalist production and survival systems, in which not the outside 
markets, but the internal balance of consumption and production 
are regarded to be central.  
 
 
2. PEASANTRIES AND HISTORICAL CAPITALISM 
 
  After  five  centuries  of  an  emerging  capitalist  world-economy 
and two centuries of true globalization of that system, about 50% 
of  the  world  population  is  still  labelled  as  peasants.  This  figure 
means two things: First, the ratio must have been much higher un-
til only recently, even in the West. Secondly, our time marks a fun-
damental shift. For the first time in world history, less than half of 
the population lives “from the land.” If we take rural population as a 
(maximum) proxy, the evolutions and the predictions are clear. 
  What does this tell us about the relationship between peasan-
tries and capitalism? A quick look at the literature on peasantries 
in a  historical  perspective  shows  that  the  concept  is  still  highly 
under-theorized. Broadly speaking, we can define peasants as mem-
bers of rural, agricultural households, who control the land they 
work, either as tenants or as smallholders, who are organized gen-
erally  in  households  and  in  village  communities  that  meet  most  
of their subsistence needs (production, exchange, credit), who pool  REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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Table 1 
Rural Population (% total population) 
    Total     World         Africa     Asia      Mid &         North       Europe 
      Population         %        (number)        South        America 
                America 
       (billion) 
1950   2.54      71%          (1.79)        85%      83%       58%          36%           49% 
1970   3.70      64%          (2.37)        77%      77%       43%          26%           37% 
1990   5.29      57%          (3.02)        68%      68%       29%          25%           29% 
2000   6.12      53%          (3.27)        64%      63%       25%          21%           27% 
2010   6.91      49%          (3.41)        60%      57%       21%          18%           26% 
2030   8.32      40%          (3.35)        50%      46%       15%          13%           21% 
2050   9.19      30%          (2.79)        38% 
Source: U.N. World Urbanization Prospects. The 2007 Revision Population 
Database (http://esa.un.org/unup) 
 
different  forms  of  income,  and  who  are  ruled  by  other  social 
groups, which extract a surplus either directly via rents, via (non-
balanced) markets, or through control of state power (taxation). 
Key words are (some degree of) autonomy, income-pooling, house-
hold-based village structures, and surplus extraction outside local 
control. 
  This ambiguous relationship with the outside world is responsi-
ble for the often complicated scientific interpretation of peasant-
ries; consider the famous quote of Fernand Braudel: “The peasant 
himself, when he regularly sells a part of his harvest and buys tools 
and clothing, is already a part of the market. But if he comes to the 
market town to sell a few items—eggs or a chicken—in order to ob-
tain a few coins with which to pay his taxes or buy a plowshare, he 
is merely pressing his nose against the shopwindow of the market-
place” (Braudel, 1977: 19). Market versus non-market: that seems 
to remain the question. 
  Much literature is spent on the internal differences between peas-
ants (economic, demographic, legal, etc.). The work of Chayanov was 
very instrumental to understand some of these differences. Now 
forgotten  (Marxist)  debates  on  different  (feudal  vs.  capitalist) 
modes of production or differentiation within peasantries started 
from a clear distinction between peasant and modern, capitalist so-
cieties. Eric Wolf’s Peasants (1966) is, among others, important in 
the paradigm shift toward a more integrated view. “Wolf’s peasants 
live, instead, in economies where secular swings in intertwined and 
highly contingent markets determine economic options ... where 
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as distant financial sectors” (Scott, 1998: 199). Three decades ago, 
the sociologist Teodor Shanin tore down the dualist view when he 
argued that “measuring peasant capitalism lies at the heart of the 
major concerns of contemporary social science. It has to do with 
capitalism as a process, it relates the understanding of the origins 
of our time to the characterization of the essential tenets of the 
global system we live in” (Shanin, 1980: 89). In this way he criti-
cized both classical and Marxist political economy, which explained 
capitalism “outside peasant economies and societies,” with the as-
sumption “that capitalism equals de-peasantation” (Shanin, 1980: 
89). In his introduction to a reprint of Chayanov’s The Theory of 
Peasant Economy, Shanin wrote: 
The only way to handle effectively contemporary social real-
ity is through models and theories in which peasant family 
farms do not operate separately and where peasant econo-
my does not merely accompany other economic forms but 
is inserted into and usually subsumed under a dominant po-
litical economy, different in type. Also peasant economies 
are being transformed (and even re-established) mostly by 
“external” intervention, especially by the state and the multi-
national companies (1986: 12). 
  It seems clear that the role and fate of peasantries in the last 
few centuries can be understood only in regard to the rise of his-
torical capitalism as an integrated societal model. 
 
 
3. PEASANT ECONOMIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
THE FLEMISH EXAMPLE 
 
  The debate on the relationship between agrarian and economic 
change is often immobilized by a double dualism: a) the antago-
nism between internal relations and structures of production, re-
production, and power and external markets; and b) the antago-
nism  between  non-  or  precapitalist  and  capitalistic  production 
relations and markets. The fate of peasant economies cannot be 
meaningfully evaluated within these dualisms, in terms of produc-
tion or circulation, in terms of traditional or modern (capitalist). REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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  The story of Flemish peasant agriculture in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries illuminates this point (Vanhaute, 1993; 2001). 
This Flemish Husbandry originated in the “long” thirteenth century, 
only  to  disappear  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
(Thoen, 2001). The secular trend of commercialization within the 
Flemish countryside did not alter structurally the Flemish peasant 
economy. On the contrary, this rural organization was responsible 
for a very substantial long term increase of both total agricultural 
output and land productivity. Moreover, the Flemish peasant econ-
omy  generated  huge  capital  surpluses;  until  the  late  nineteenth 
century,  it  was  responsible  for  the  greater  part  of  the  Flemish 
“national”  income.  In  the  long  term,  the  Flemish  rural  society, 
based on peasant farming and income pooling, was an extremely 
rewarding economic system. Surpluses of goods, labor, and capital 
could be directed toward profitable markets, without undermining, 
at least until the nineteenth century, the basic logics of the rural 
survival  economy.  Two  processes  went  hand-in-hand  and  even 
strengthened each other: 1) an increasing input of household labor 
to sustain the household survival; and 2) the pruning away of pro-
ductivity  profits  (of  land  and  industrial  activities)  toward  social 
groups mainly outside the rural society. This was done mainly by 
adjusting  land  rents,  not  only  to  higher  land  yields,  but  also  to 
higher combined household earnings, including extra-agricultural 
activities. 
  The example of the Flemish agro-system reveals the survival of 
a peasant agriculture within a world that was becoming commer-
cialized. The basic logics of the peasant household (family labor, 
subsistence  production,  survival  strategies)  determined  the  agro-
system in the greater part of what is now Flanders and Belgium 
until the second half of the nineteenth century. The peasant house-
hold was fully integrated in local and regional exchange networks 
of goods, labor, and capital. These internal exchange circuits were 
kept together by a credit and debt system that was dictated by local 
needs. The success of the Flemish peasant economy was based on a 
twofold, interlinked principle: first, higher yields of land and labor 
in general, which were pruned away in an indirect way; and second-
ly, social costs of commercialization, which were passed on to the 
peasant family, rather than, as in Great Britain, on to a rural land-
less class. How can we understand these processes within Flemish 
agriculture and rural society?  REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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  a)  The  unmistakable  processes  of  growth  within  the  Flemish 
countryside can only be explained by the cohabitation of a growing 
commercial capitalism with a vast peasant economy. Processes of 
commercialization not only extracted in an indirect way the profits 
of the combined labor input on the countryside, they also provided 
the means for an age-long survival of this mixed economy. It is im-
possible to understand the logic of the Flemish economy before 
the  nineteenth  century  without  integrating  both  traditional  and 
modern systems of (re)production and exchange. This challenges 
the proposition that capitalism only exists where commerce con-
trols and determines the structure of (rural) production in a pre-
conditioned way. 
  b)  This  interpretation  surpasses  both  Braudel  and  Brenner. 
Braudel  correctly  described  the  symbiosis  of  the  worlds of  daily 
(material) production and of market exchange. The highly artificial 
delinking of the countermarket of capitalism (defined as autono-
mous commercial chains) troubles his analysis of the Early Modern 
European  economy  (Braudel,  1977).  Local  and  regional  markets 
cannot be interpreted merely in the context of an emerging capital-
ist system (in which he is correct), but neither can they be isolated 
from it. As argued, markets can function in both ways, strength-
ening local labor relations and exchange circuits and directing sur-
pluses toward external markets. Brenner (1997) insists on a break-
through  of  capitalist  property  relations  as  a  prerequisite  for 
modern economic growth; but I doubt that we can make a unilater-
al and stringent interpretation of this relationship. First, long-term 
profit maximization is possible in (close) relationship with peasant 
economies. Secondly, capitalist relations must also be interpreted 
in the context of emerging and changing interregional and interna-
tional division of labor. Ergo, I argue for an interpretation scheme 
with two axes: First, the organization of production and reproduc-
tion (social property relations); secondly, the processes of econom-
ic integration and the flows of goods, labor, and capital. The fol-
lowing  example  from  two  different  regions  in  Flanders  clarifies 
this. 
  c) Until the late nineteenth century, Inner-Flanders was a much 
more commercialized peasant economy than the Campine region 
east  of  Antwerp.  The  consequences  are  obvious:  higher  yields, 
more leaseholding, higher rents, more local markets, more profits. REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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The peasant economy of the Campine region was much more inte-
grated within the village society, including common land and com-
mon regulations. This situation resulted from a divergent historical 
evolution: In the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries, the Campine area 
was strongly integrated, albeit as a peripheral region, into the Ant-
werp  market  economy.  Export  products  such  as  wool  and  cloth 
were sold on the Antwerp market. But in the seventeenth, eight-
eenth,  and  early  nineteenth  centuries,  the  Campine  region  was 
largely disconnected from any central market place; internal rela-
tions of production and exchange were much less challenged in 
this region. This means that the place of a region within the over-
arching economic division of labor matters a great deal. These net-
works of (unequal) exchange can cover different economic systems, 
but for that reason cannot be called less capitalist.  
  d) There is no such thing as an automatic transformation of a 
regional  and  even  national  market  system  in  a  global  capitalist 
market (Braudel, 1977: 75; Polanyi, 1957: 57). No general line of 
evolution exists, as the roads to integration differ greatly according 
to local/regional circumstances. This interaction is often studied in 
the context of transformation. What do we mean by this concept? 
How  can  processes  of  transformation  be  correctly  evaluated  as 
processes of (slow) transition from one societal system to another, 
with long periods during which different systems exist next to each 
other and even thanks to each other? Long-term societal shifts on 
the European continent from the Middle Ages onwards can only 
fully understood when the changes of the “great transformation” 
of the “long” nineteenth century are included in the overall pic-
ture.  
  e) Interpreting the “Flemish case” within the debate on mar-
kets/production relations as prime movers reveals Flanders as an 
interesting  case.  The  emergence  of  a  commercializing,  capitalist 
system  does  not  necessarily  break  down  traditional  production 
structures, and certainly not on a short-term basis. On the contrary, 
the advantages of (part-time) unpaid household labor are a conditio 
sine qua non for the growth of a capitalist world-economy (Smith & 
Wallerstein, 1992; Vanhaute, 1993). This becomes clear when we 
look at the working of colonial economies in the twentieth century 
and  even  at  the  globalizing  capitalism  of  the  early  twenty-first 
century. Could it be that this interaction between capitalist profits REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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and cheap and unpaid household labor is not a relic of the past, 
but the main road to modern economic transformations? 
 
 
4. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE DECLINE 
OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE, THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE 
  
  A central problem of contemporary global society concerns the 
failure  of  the  capitalist  world-economy  to  advance  without  limit 
and at the same time to secure general welfare in ways expected by 
the  nineteenth-century  theories  of  progress,  liberal  and  socialist 
alike.  Or  is  the  failure  due,  conversely,  to  the  world  not  being 
“modern” enough? This dispute often centers on the European ex-
ample, related to contemporary problems of poverty and famine. 
  Europe’s  great  escape  from  hunger  and  famine  in  the  nine-
teenth century went—chronologically—hand-in-hand with the end of 
the European peasantry. The conclusion seems to be straightfor-
ward: famines are related to peasant societies and so-called back-
ward economies, while modernization equals the end of famines as 
something “incorporated into man’s biological regime” (Braudel, 
1981:  73).  However,  this  important  event  in  world  history,  and 
more generally the rise of the West, cannot be understood without 
taking into account the broader context of the transformation of 
the capitalist world-system. Or: Europe could escape also and only 
because  of  its  position  in  the  nineteenth-century  international 
economy. Two elements are central here. 
  First, even with the unprecedented increase of land and labor 
productivity in agriculture, Europe became a net importer of basic 
foodstuffs  in  order  to  feed  its  own  population.  Great  Britain 
around 1900, for example, had to import 70% of its bread grains 
and 40% of its meat from outside Europe. The cost of these huge 
imports could only be paid by the profits of the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Secondly, Europe disposed of an important part of its own 
surplus labor by migration to the periphery of the world-system, 
the non-European world. In the nineteenth century, 40 to 50 mil-
lion Europeans left the Old Continent. 
  So, Europe’s escape from hunger is a result of both a spectacu-
lar transformation of its old society, creating huge financial sur-
pluses,  and,  as  the  center of  the nineteenth  century world-econ-REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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omy, of having and using its own periphery. To put it more bluntly: 
for  Great  Britain’s  hegemony  and  the  resultant  commitment  to 
laisser-faire, both Ireland and India paid a high price. The big differ-
ence is that present-day weak economies do not have the power 
and the opportunities a) to import basic foodstuffs on the basis of 
self-regulated trade terms and b) to export surplus population to 
new peripheries (or present-day core countries). 
  Europe’s example did not stop the threat of famines. On the 
contrary, more people than ever died in twentieth-century famines, 
and in the twenty-first century, structural food insecurity will still 
be at the top of the world agenda. Although per capita agricultural 
output rose more than 20% between 1960 and 2000, there are no 
signs of a structural decline in overall malnutrition. According to 
statistics released by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the world counted 920 million undernour-
ished people in 1970, 800 million in 1995, and 850 million in 2006. 
This  is  still one of  every  five or  six  men,  women,  and children. 
Moreover, the group of people facing temporary food insecurity is 
not counted, and seems to rise (cf. urbanization and the contempo-
rary food riots). This is related to the fact that the improvement of 
the general nutritional status is very unequally spread geograph-
ically. General improvement of these statistics is due mainly to an 
improved situation in China. Average caloric intake in China in-
creased 66% between 1960 and 2000, against 21% in India and a 
mere  7%  in  Africa  (FAO;  Institute  for  Food  and  Development 
Policy). 
  In  the  meantime,  the  belief  that  a  “green  revolution”  would 
solve  the  problem  of  food  insecurity  faded  away.  Technical  im-
provements raise output and productivity substantially, but do not 
guarantee  food  security  on  a  global  scale.  For  example,  in  the 
twentieth century, about 75% of the existing food variety has been 
lost. The world is more and more dependent on a selected number 
of crops and varieties. Nowadays three of every four countries fac-
ing severe child malnutrition are net food exporters. India exports 
60 million tons of rice and wheat every year, but has 200 million 
undernourished inhabitants. Brazil, the world’s major soya export-
er, used mainly to produce cat and dog food, counts 20 million un-REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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5. THE END OF PEASANTRIES AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY,  
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL PICTURE 
 
  The world is facing increasing global inequality. While in the 
early nineteenth century, the income gap between the richest and 
poorest countries was 3 to 1, this increased to 11 to 1 in the early 
twentieth century and to more than 70 to 1 in the late twentieth 
century. One reason for this acceleration is that population growth 
has been situated mainly in the so-called less developed world. In 
2050, more than 90% of the world population will live in the re-
gions we now call the Third World. 
  I believe there is a structural relationship between growing in-
equality and the marginalization and eventual dismantling of peas-
antries, although this is hard to prove with existing statistics. The 
sharpest rise in global inequality occurs after 1950, the period in 
which de-peasantization really takes off. Between 1950 and 2010 
the share of rural population declines, from 71% to 49% (see table 
1 above). The numbers of agricultural population (families living 
predominantly  from  agricultural  income)  drop  even  more,  from 
65% of the world population in 1950 to 42% in 2000, and they are 
expected to drop to 38% by 2010 (FAO). In mid-twentieth-century 
Africa and Asia, about 80% of the population lived predominantly 
from agriculture; in 2010 this will be less than 50%. It is expected 
that both rural and agricultural population will decline also in abso-
lute terms from 2010–20 onwards. 
  Recently,  international  organizations  have  reformulated  their 
view of the relationship between development and peasantries. The 
World Development Report 2006, Equity and Development states: “Land 
is a key asset for poor people.... Inequality in the ownership of 
land has such far-reaching consequences for the well-being and the 
organization  of  society  for  generations  to  come”  (World  Bank, 
2006: 162). However, the quantification of a global relationship be-
                                                 
 
1  The  statistics  were  compiled  by  the  author  from  Food  and  Agricultural 
Organization and Institute for Food and Development Policy websites. 
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tween peasant economies and social inequality is almost unachiev-
able, because of the lack of reliable figures (who are peasants? how 
is internal inequality measured?) and because we calculate only na-
tional  averages  (combining  urban  and  rural  data).  One  example 
plots the relationship between female labor participation in agricul-
ture (as a proxy for family-based agriculture) and social inequality 
in  so-called  medium-  and  low-income  countries  (World  Bank, 
2006), suggesting that in the non-Western world, social inequality 
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6. OUTLINES FOR NEW RESEARCH 
ON THE END OF PEASANTRIES 
 
  The focus of a research project on the end of peasantries has to 
be comparative and global. It has to integrate diverging scales from 
the local to the global, and it has to analyze in exclusive terms de-
fined social formations as an integral part of an inclusive overarch-
ing system. In this way we aim to discern different roads of transi-
tion,  related  to  different  frames  of  place  and  time,  putting  the 
British/European transition into perspective. This aim is not only 
ambitious, but also necessary and possible. Necessary, because this 
comparative and global angle is the only way to evaluate, in a non-
Eurocentric  way,  the  impact  of  this  most  important  transition 
process since the Neolithic agricultural revolution. It is possible be-
cause of new developments in modern world history and global 
studies, in focus, methodology, sources, and in possibilities for col-
laboration (Manning, 2003). Such a project is backed by two main 
hypotheses. 
  First, the global economic world-system, with its roots in the 
European Middle Ages, has fuelled itself by a process of incorpora-
tion, transformation, and eventually, absorption of its peasant soci-
eties. The extraction of goods, labor, and capital from the “non-
capitalist” rural society was vital for the expansion of the system. 
Secondly, this disintegration has promoted, rather than diminished 
social inequality, by a twofold process: by the creation of a bigger 
middle class, which receives higher wages in new sectors, and by 
the increase of income and survival insecurity in the lower social 
groups that derive a living from unskilled labor (pressure on wages, 
and dismantling of common goods, such as land, energy, water, so-
cial protection, etc.). Timing and phasing of these processes are 
very  unequal  over  time  and  place,  and  this  is  what  the  project 
wants to reconstruct. 
  Such a research project has to be structured in two steps. First, 
the process of disintegration of peasant societies must be recon-
structed in a global context. Secondly, an analysis of the causes and 
the consequences of this process must be undertaken, differentiat-
ing general causes, related to the global process of transformation 
and specific causes, related to time and place. A double research 
strategy underlies this structure: First, the global angle, collection REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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of data about peasants and peasant societies on a global scale (sta-
tistics on demography, labor, agriculture, income, etc.); secondly, a 
comparative  analysis  of  the  transformation  and  dismantling  of 
peasant societies in different times and places. These have to be 
described as cases and analyzed in a comparative way. The focus 
will  be  on  the  functioning  of  the  peasant  societies  (households, 
local, regional level), the position of these societies within broader 
societal structures (trade and commerce, fiscality, power and prop-
erty relations, regulation) and the transformation of these societies, 
with the effects on social relations, survival, and income positions. 
A broad comparative research is preferred, with cases from north-
west Europe, the Ottoman Empire, China (Yangtze valley), West 
Africa (West Sudan), South America (Brazil). 
  This twofold research strategy will collect information on four 
themes: ruralization/urbanization; demographic processes and pat-
terns;  income  structures;  social  protection  and  inequality.  The 
combination of these themes will shed a light on the main question 
of the research project; timing, causes, and effects of the end of 
peasantries on a global scale. 
  Naturally  such  a  research  project  shares  common  concerns, 
questions, and premises. First, peasants/peasantries/peasant socie-
ties need a new conceptualization, one not based on a dualistic, 
linear, evolutionist modernization view, but as part of a global per-
spective on the origins, growth, and functioning of the capitalist 
world-system. I define peasant societies not as autarchic, antimar-
ket communities, but as rural societies based on a number of in-
ternal and external equilibria (internal: labor and income division 
within  households,  means  of  production,  crop  rotation,  balance 
between arable and livestock farming; external: exchange relations 
of labor, goods, services). This system, as the examples of Flanders 
and the regions outside the old West show, proved to be extremely 
resilient, even within a context of a society that was becoming com-
mercialized.  
  Even more, as Wallerstein suggested, peasantries are absolutely 
necessary for the survival of historical capitalism. It is the emer-
gence of what he calls semiproletarian households that guarantees 
“the lowest possible wage-level threshold” (Wallerstein, 2003: 39). 
“What is surprising is not that there has been so much proletarian-
ization, but there had been so little. Four hundred years at least in-
to the existence of a historical system, the amount of fully proletari-REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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anized labor in the capitalist world-economy today cannot be said 
to total even fifty percent” (2003: 23). 
  Secondly, peasant societies are the best guarantee against large-
scale human disasters. During and after famines, for example, peas-
ant societies absorbed the tensions and acted as a buffer. That is 
why famines within peasant societies were short-term events, con-
fined to restricted geographical areas and, in general, taking the 
lives of a limited number of people. In this respect, the extremely 
high death toll of the Irish famine in the 1840’s is an exception, the 
result of the total breakdown of the local structures of the peasant-
ry (O’Grada et al., 2007). 
  In the contemporary, globalized world, with a substantial share 
of the population living on or under the basic level of food securi-
ty, and with peasant societies disappearing at a high rate, famines 
threaten to become major disasters that last for extended periods 
of time, cover broad geographical areas, and involve tens of mil-
lions of people. For one of the major trends in the expansion of 
the capitalist world-system is the undermining and eventually disap-
pearance of small-scale, diversified, community-based agricultural 
systems, and their replacement by corporate-run, market- and export- 
oriented monocultures. This has raised total production and the 
productivity of land and labor, but also has promoted dependence 
on a small number of crops, on international corporates, and on 
global market systems. Besides high outputs, corporate large-scale 
agriculture also generates high costs, which are in large part hid-
den: social costs (displacement), ecological costs (such as degrada-
tion of the soil and of water supplies), and energy costs (intensive 
exploitation, transport). 
  Thirdly, in one way or another, the future is in a new peasanta-
tion. This means an age-old trend must be adapted. Structural and 
global food security will not result from the expansion of a global 
free-market  ideology,  because  food  security  in  one  part  of  the 
world was, is, and will be at the cost of more insecurity in other 
parts. On the contrary, food security must be based on a diversity 
of more secure food systems. These systems need to be embedded 
in local and regional rural communities that are interconnected, 
but also protected, and in control of their own land and resources. 
International  food  policy  must  be  based  on  the  promotion  and 
support  of  diverse,  productive,  and  sustainable  food  systems  (in REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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plural).  Food  security  must  be  regarded  as  a  multidimensional 
phenomenon,  with  at  least  three  levels:  global  (world),  regional 
(community), and individual (household). Elements of an overall, 
global action program includes, first of all, the principle of subsidi-
arity. Whenever production can be achieved by local farmers, using 
local  resources  for  local  consumption,  rules and  benefits  should 
favor that option, thus shortening the distance between production 
and consumption. New rules should permit the judicious use of 
selected trade tariffs and import quotas to regulate imports of food 
and to prevent dumping. A new policy program must also focus on 
localizing food regulations and standards, localizing rules on intel-
lectual property and patenting, promoting redistributive land re-
form,  and  eliminating  direct  export  subsidies  and  dumping.  In 
short, individual and household access rights need to be guaran-
teed: access to land, access to commons (water, air, energy, knowl-
edge), access to credit, access to (protected) markets, and access to 
protection (security systems). 
  Fourthly, in the expansion of the global capitalist system, the 
existence of peasantries was and still is pivotal. Global transforma-
tion seems not to have followed the “British way,” in which a dis-
solving peasant society is replaced by a capitalist agriculture, as sug-
gested by (Eurocentric) modernization stories. The “continental” 
variant,  which  “skims”  the  peasants  until  their  basis  of  survival 
becomes too weak, is the dominant path that the peasantries of the 
world have followed and still follow. Or as Shanin wrote: “Capital-
ist profit-accountancy prevailed over the capitalist form of produc-
tion” (Shanin, 1986: 3). 
 
 
7. PEASANTRIES AND THE NEW AGRARIAN QUESTION 
 
  The world of today faces a new “agrarian question.” This meta-
phor refers of course to the Agrafrage of Karl Kautsky, in which the 
process of the decline of the peasantry and of power concentration 
within agriculture is seen as a necessary stage in the collectivization 
of the rural sector (1966). Nowadays, the agrarian question, mani-
fested in global struggles for land, sovereignity, and security, is not 
only much larger and more encompassing, but it also needs new 
answers. “This broader ‘agrarian question’ focuses attention on the 
relentless assault on small farming by a new balance of forces, in-REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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cluding financial relations incorporating agriculture into global in-
dustrial-retailing circuits, intellectual property, [and] rights proto-
cols”  (McMichael,  2006:  407).  Philip  McMichael  concludes:  “In 
other words, the contemporary global agrarian question is pivotal 
to  all  other  social  arrangements”  (2006:  415).  Samir  Amin  ap-
proves:  “The  ‘agrarian  question,’  far  from  being  solved,  is  now 
more than ever at the heart of the major challenges which humani-
ty  will  face  during  the  twenty-first  century”  (Amin,  2005:  271; 
2003).  
  Understanding the new agrarian questions needs new historical 
knowledge of the role of peasantries within capitalist transforma-
tions. The existing knowledge is all too often still deformed by a 
twofold myopia. First, the much praised British road to capitalist 
agriculture, including rapid depeasantation, seems not to be the 
standard road to development. On the contrary, the survival and 
eventual  slow  decay  of  peasantries  and  small-scale  agriculture 
within the expansion of the modern world-economy—I call it the 
Flemish  road—is  much  more  the  normal  journey  of  peasants 
throughout the world. Secondly, the inevitability of the European 
experience, the dissolution of the peasantries within the industrial 
and postindustrial economies, is not and cannot be the example 
for most of the non-Western world. Being at the top of the global 
pyramid, Europe could easily and cheaply transform, by importing 
the basic products it needs and exporting its surplus labor to its 
former colonies. 
  Laying down the old macropremises of Westernized develop-
ment, and at the same time going back to the microhistories of our 
own rural past reveals a different picture, one of family-based agri-
culture that has always been and still is a highly productive system, 
which  combines  diversified  production  chains,  strategies  of  risk 
minimalization, stimuli for local and regional income and exchange 
systems, and a high sense of ecological protection. All this under 
precondition of regional market systems that guarantee both trans-
parency and protection, of secured access to land, and guaranteed 
rights to use common goods, such as water and natural resources 
(see e.g., Altieri & Nicholls, 2005).  
  The historical experience has to be complemented by contem-
porary analysis, such as of the success of the East Asian way, which 
protects  land  rights,  credit  systems,  and  market  access.  Between REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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1981 and 2001, poverty in rural China dropped from 75% to 12%. 
This shows that “the peasant approach,” which engages and does 
not marginalize peasantries in the process of economic moderniza-
tion, can produce results that could be more socially just and more 
ecologically  sustainable  than  the  much  propagated  British  and 
European  paths.  Philip  McMichael  calls  this  “the  peasant  way,” 
strategies to reconstitute “peasant spaces” which can challenge the 
current dominant corporate food regime (McMichael, 2006: 413–
15). These spaces combine local forms of social reproduction with 
local  strategies  of  income  and  food  security  and  local  forms  of 
knowledge. Most important is the peasant knowledge of internaliz-
ing costs of production and reproduction, contrary to the domi-
nant and ultimately dead-end tendency within historical capitalism 
to externalize social and ecological costs. This logic of subsistence 
has roots in a peasant past and contradicts the lessons of European 
capitalist modernity. 
  Recently William H. McNeill made a plea to the field of global 
history for more attention to what he calls “the peasant and ex-
peasant majority of humankind” (McNeill, 2006: 286). This was one 
of his “afterthoughts” in an edited book on interconnections be-
tween the universal and the local: “But it seems to me also worth 
knowing that across most of the world another universal has been 
at work, disrupting age-old local self-sufficiency and village autono-
my  by  folding  the  rural  population  into  an  urban-based,  urban-
managed, high-tech, flow-through society, whose potentialities for 
the multiplication of wealth are matched only by its potentialities 
for unprecedented disaster” (2006: 290). He marks the middle of 
the twentieth century as a turning point: “But until about 1950 the 
majority of human beings still lived in villages and raised most or 
all of the food they consumed. That elementary fact created a safe-
ty net for times of trouble whenever the flow of goods and services 
that  sustained  cities  experienced  temporary  breakdown....  The 
post-World  War  II  transformation  of  urban-rural  relationships 
affected far larger numbers around the globe, with long-term con-
sequences yet to be seen” (2006: 287). The consequences of this 
new “great transformation” cannot be properly assessed, but it is 
clear, according to McNeill, that the biological and cultural conti-
nuity of humankind is at stake. Thus it is a prime task facing global 
history to get a better understanding of this “intensely local yet also REVIEW XXXI, 1, CR  Monday, September 15, 2008 10:48 AM 
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